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Abstract Scarcity has been found to intensify value,
positive or negative, rather than simply enhancing it. Some
researchers have proposed that scarcity affects value by
increasing how much attention is paid to a stimulus. We
conceptualized sustained attention as stronger engagement
and operationalized a situation of scarcity by telling par-
ticipants who were choosing between two objects that the
object that was chosen would then be replaced (Replenish)
or not replaced (Scarce). To distinguish sustained attention-
stronger engagement in a situation of scarcity from grab-
bing attention (salience from distinctiveness), the choice
was between one option with a single instance (solitary-
high salience) and a second option with several duplicates
(abundant-low salience). We predicted that stronger
engagement from a situation of scarcity would, first,
intensify the value of the chosen item regardless of whether
it was solitary or abundant, with positive items becoming
more positive and negative items becoming more negative,
and second, the stronger engagement from the situation of
scarcity would transfer intensification to another separate
object in the same setting. The results of Studies 1 and 2
supported both of these predictions. Study 3 tested a
boundary condition for these scarcity–engagement effects
in terms of how real participants experienced the choice
items to be, where ‘realness’ is another source of engage-
ment strength. As expected, the scarcity–engagement effect
on intensifying value was replicated for participants who
experienced the activity as real but was eliminated for
those who did not.
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The merit of an object, which is in any degree either useful or beautiful, is
greatly enhanced by its scarcity.
Adam Smith (1937).
Introduction
It has long been recognized that scarcity can enhance value.
There has been a rich history of research on the relation
between scarcity and value, starting with evidence that scarcity
can enhance the value of an object (Brock 1968; Cialdini 1985;
Fromkin 1970; Fromkin and Brock 1973; Lynn 1987; Worchel
et al. 1975;Verhallen 1982; Zellinger et al. 1975). It subse-
quently became clear that scarcity does not only affect the
value of desirable things. Research demonstrated that, rather
than simply enhancing value, scarcity can intensify evaluative
responses for negative events as well in contexts like person
attribution (Frieze and Weiner 1971), intimate self-disclosure
(Petty and Mirels 1981), reaction to medical diagnoses (Ditto
and Jemmott 1989), and persuasive communication (Bozzolo
and Brock 1992). In a special issue concerned with such
intensification effects of scarcity, several possible underlying
mechanisms were proposed (Pratkanis and Farquhar 1992),
including increased attention (Bozzolo and Brock 1992; Brock
and Brannon 1992; Folger 1992). Notably, in some cases the
increased attention was described in terms of greater sustained
attention (e.g., Bozzolo and Brock 1992), whereas in other
cases enhanced salience drawing attention was emphasized
(Folger 1992; Pratkanis and Farquhar 1992).
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The proposal that scarcity increases attention, which then
intensifies evaluative responses, has important implications
when viewed through the lens of regulatory engagement
theory given that engagement is defined in terms of sustained
attention (Higgins 2006; Higgins and Scholer 2009). The
major purpose of our research was to investigate two impli-
cations that have not been tested directly. First, if a situation of
scarcity strengthens engagement, then a situation of scarcity
should make a positive object more positive and a negative
object more negative, and if these effects derive from
‘engagement-sustained attention’ rather than ‘salience-
drawing attention’, then the scarcity effect should occur
independent of whether the chosen object has high or low
salience. Second, and more important, if creating a situation of
scarcity strengthens engagement, then it should be possible to
manipulate scarcity using one set of objects, and then observe
intensification effects on a completely separate object, as long
as that separate object is present within the same setting.
Early research on scarcity
Brock’s (1968) commodity theory stated that ‘any com-
modity will be valued to the extent that it is scarce,
unavailable, or difficult to attain.’ Researchers found sup-
port for this claim using consumer products like women’s
apparel (Fromkin 1970), cookies (Worchel et al. 1975)
cookbooks (Verhallen 1982), censored desirable materials
(Fromkin and Brock 1973; Zellinger et al. 1975), and
paintings (Lynn 1987). Adding scarcity to positively val-
enced objects increased their value.
Research in communication began to suggest that add-
ing scarcity to a communication intensifies the evaluative
response to that communication even when the response is
negative (Bozzolo and Brock 1992; Ditto and Jemmott
1989; Frieze and Weiner 1971). In order to reconcile these
opposing effects of scarcity on value, Brock and Brannon
(1992) liberalized commodity theory, extending its scope
to messages, experiences, traits and skills, and negative
objects, granting that commodifying factors polarize
evaluative responses. Adding scarcity to (positive) pro-
ducts enhanced their value, but adding scarcity in many
other areas intensified both positive and negative value.
This intensification research also helped reveal a mech-
anism underlying scarcity’s effects on value. Ditto and
Jemmott (1989) brought participants into a physician’s
office and diagnosed them all with a medical condition
called thioamine acetylase, a non-existent medical condition
invented for use in this study. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of four descriptions of this medical condi-
tion: thioamine acetylase was rare (vs. common), and had
positive (vs. negative) consequences for human health,
creating a 2 (prevalence: rare/common) 9 2 (health conse-
quences: negative/positive) factorial design. After being
diagnosed with thioamine acetylase, patients in the positive
health condition judged the disease to be more healthful
when told it was rare than common. In contrast, patients in
the negative health condition judged the disease to be less
healthful when told it was rare than common. Among par-
ticipants in the negative health condition, those who
believed it was rare not only reported experiencing more
fear and anxiety about having the condition, but they also
sought out more information about the medical condition
than participants who believed it was negative but common.
This work was among the first to identify a mechanism
associated with the polarization effects found in the scar-
city literature. It demonstrated that scarcity increased the
likelihood participants would request additional informa-
tion in positive and negative valence conditions, suggesting
that scarcity causes people to exert more attentional
resources. Researchers used the area of persuasive com-
munication to build on this discovery and examine the
effect of scarcity and valence on the value of a persuasive
message.
Bozzolo and Brock (1992) tested scarcity’s ability to
increase participants’ attention to strongly and weakly
argued messages, and found that participants reading
scarce (vs. nonscarce) messages (i.e., manipulating the
degree to which access to a message is restricted) showed
higher ratings of perceived effort. Researchers in this area
proposed that scarcity attracts attention and sustains
attention, including increasing motivation to scrutinize,
process, and elaborate (Bozzolo and Brock 1992; Brock
and Brannon 1992; Folger 1992). Research in the domain
of products has supported this understanding that scarcity
increases attention, and that increased attention intensifies
evaluative reactions to stimuli. Some research has found,
for example, that scarce packaging design, i.e., packaging
that deviates from that same product’s usual packaging,
increases the amount of attention participants pay to the
product in an experiment (Schoormans and Robben 1997).
However, the possible effects from the scarcity of one set
of objects on evaluative reactions to a separate object have
not yet been considered. The purpose of our research was
to investigate these issues using regulatory engagement
theory (Higgins 2006) as our guide.
Regulatory engagement and value
Our research was inspired by the scarcity literature’s pro-
posal that scarcity sustains attention to a target because
regulatory engagement theory (RET) defines engagement
in terms of sustained attention: ‘‘The state of being
engaged is to be involved, occupied, and interested in
something. Strong engagement is to concentrate on some-
thing, to be absorbed or engrossed with it. (Higgins 2006,
p. 442, italics in the original)’’. RET proposes that value is
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a motivational force experience (cf. Lewin 1951). Experi-
encing something as having positive value corresponds to
experiencing attraction toward it (e.g., trying to move
toward it) and experiencing something as having negative
value corresponds to experiencing repulsion from it (e.g.,
trying to move away from it). As a motivational force
experience, the value experience varies not only in direc-
tion but also in intensity (i.e., weak or strong intensity).
Importantly, although direction and intensity as force
experiences are experienced holistically, they are distinct
from one another with respect to their sources. Specifically,
there can be a variable that contributes to value intensity
without contributing to value direction. And strength of
engagement is one such variable—stronger engagement
intensifies positive and negative reactions without itself
determining whether the reaction is positive or negative.
The sustained attention involved in engagement refers to
recruiting resources when maintaining attention to an
object or activity, and the motivational force experience of
attraction or repulsion is intensified by this resource
recruitment.
In our lab, engagement strength has been measured in a
number of different ways, including task persistence (e.g.,
Fo¨rster et al. 1998), increased attention to a task (e.g.,
Bianco et al. 2003; Cesario and Higgins 2008), and task
performance (e.g., Bianco et al. 2003; Shah et al. 1998).
Our research has also found that when people are strongly
engaged in what they are doing, they respond more posi-
tively to a positive object or event and more negatively to a
negative object or event.
As one example of how strength of engagement in what
you are doing can affect the positivity of a positive target,
Higgins et al. (2012) examined the impact of engagement
on the value of a prize. Adverse background noises played
while participants worked to solve enough anagrams to win
a prize, and strength of engagement in the prize-related
work depended on how the participants were instructed to
deal with the adversity. When people encounter adversity
in goal pursuit, they can either redouble their focus on the
task at hand—e.g., the kind of response to difficulty that
Woodworth (1940) described as resistance, such as leaning
into a wind that is impeding your progress—or they can
direct their attention away from the task at hand and attend
instead to something else, such as their unpleasant feelings.
In the Higgins et al. (2012) study, the participants were
instructed to deal with the noise either by ‘‘opposing’’ it as
an interference or by ‘‘coping’’ with the unpleasant feelings
it created. Poorer recognition of the content of the back-
ground noise was used to check that participants did indeed
follow instructions by paying attention to the opposing or
coping response rather than to the background noise.
For the ‘‘opposing’’ participants, we predicted that fol-
lowing instructions would strengthen engagement in
solving the anagrams to win the prize because opposing an
interfering force strengthens engagement in what you are
doing (Higgins 2006). This prediction parallels Wood-
worth’s example of opposing the wind that is interfering
with your forward progress causing you to concentrate
even more on the focal task of moving forward. In our
experiment, we predicted that increased concentration on
the focal, prize-related task should enhance the value of the
prize from stronger engagement intensifying its positivity.
For the ‘‘coping’’ participants, we predicted that following
instructions would weaken engagement in solving the
anagrams to win the prize because the more they attended
to coping with their unpleasant feelings, the less able they
would be sustain attention on the focal, prize-related task
(i.e., disruption of sustained attention from divided atten-
tion). The resulting weakening of engagement in the focal
task would de-intensify the positivity of the prize (i.e.,
decrease its value). Both of these predictions were sup-
ported. [For another perspective on the interrelation among
adversity, engagement, and value enhancement, see also
Brehm et al. (1983) discussion of how adversity can
mobilize energy for task engagement. We will discuss this
model more in the General Discussion as it relates to what
we found in the present studies.]
There is also support for this engagement-intensification
link in other areas of research on value. Research sup-
porting regulatory engagement theory (RET) (Higgins
2006) has demonstrated that stronger engagement intensi-
fies evaluative responses in areas ranging from consumer
products to persuasive communication (e.g., Cesario et al.
2004; Higgins and Scholer 2009; Lee and Aaker 2004). To
the extent that scarcity strengthens engagement by sus-
taining attention to the focal situation, RET predicts value
intensification in situations of scarcity.
A situation of scarcity
In three experiments, participants chose between two
consumer objects. We operationalized the scarcity–
engagement link in terms of telling participants that the
object that was chosen would then be replaced (Replenish)
or not replaced (Scarcity). Knowing that the chosen object
would not be replaced creates a decision situation with an
interfering force that must be opposed to continue with the
decision-making process, and RET proposes that opposing
an interfering force strengthens engagement in the current
activity (Higgins 2006). RET predicts that this strength-
ened engagement will intensify the value of whichever
object is chosen. As mentioned earlier, this strong
engagement-sustained attention proposal is different from a
salience-drawing attention proposal. To examine the role of
salience attention independent of sustained attention, all of
the experiments involved choosing between one option
Motiv Emot (2014) 38:823–831 825
123
with a single instance (solitary-high salience) and a second
option with several duplicates (abundant-low salience).
RET predicts a value intensification effect regardless of
whether the solitary or abundant option is ultimately cho-
sen because the situation of scarcity involves both options
(Studies 1–3). We should note, however, that this does not
preclude the possibility that there could be an additional
effect on value from high versus low salience.
There is an additional implication of combining the
scarcity–sustained attention link with the engagement-
intensification link. If the ‘not replace’ condition creates a
situation of scarcity, then an object that is in the same
setting as the scarce objects, although separate from them,
might also be susceptible to intensification from the
stronger engagement produced by the situation of scarcity.
This implication is tested in Study 2. Study 3 examines
whether value intensification from stronger engagement in
a situation of scarcity also depends on the extent to which
the objects in the situation of scarcity are experienced as
real, where ‘realness’ is another source of engagement
strength (Higgins 2012).
Study 1
Method
Fifty-two university students (25 women and 27 men)
participated for pay. We presented each participant with a
tray containing cups of yogurt: several cups of one kind of
yogurt (abundant) and one cup of another kind (solitary).
Unbeknownst to the participants, all cups contained the
same slightly bitter yogurt, which was predetermined to be
mildly disliked. The participants were randomly assigned
to either the Scarce condition or the Replenish condition. In
the Replenish condition, the participants were told that
whichever cup of yogurt they chose would be replaced by
another cup of the same yogurt for the next participant in
the study. In the Scarce condition, the participants were
told that the cups of yogurt on the tray were all the yogurt
cups that were left, and whichever cup they chose would
not be replaced, creating high scarcity for the solitary cup.
We then asked participants to choose one cup of yogurt,
take one bite from that cup, and evaluate it. The partici-
pants were debriefed, thanked, and paid for their
participation.
Results
We did not expect participants to choose the solitary cup
more than one of the abundant cups in either the Scarce or
Replenish condition because previous research has shown
that even when people value a solitary item more than
abundant items, they tend not to choose it because of
politeness considerations (Lesourne 1979; Lynn 1991;
Shippee et al. 1981; Verhallen and Robben 1994). Indeed,
in neither the Scarce nor the Replenish conditions was
the solitary item chosen more than the abundant item
(v2 (1, N = 53) \ 1).
The participants disliked the yogurt. We asked them,
‘Given that a normal cup of yogurt costs $2.50, how much
would you be willing to pay for a cup of the yogurt you just
sampled?’ The average price offered was $.80, and 86.5 %
of participants offered less money than the $2.50 normal
price, thus confirming that the yogurt was generally
disliked.
Regardless of which yogurt participants chose, partici-
pants in the Scarce condition offered significantly less
money—approximately only half as much money—for the
yogurt than participants in the Replenish condition (con-
trolling for age and gender), t(52) = 2.31, p = .03, and
this difference was found among those participants who
chose the solitary cup (Scarce condition, M = $.51,
SD = .49; Replenish condition, M = $1.12, SD = 1.2)
and among those participants who chose one of the abun-
dant cups (Scarce condition, M = $.63, SD = .75;
Replenish condition, M = $1.21, SD = 1.14) (Fig. 1).
There was no significant effect of solitary versus abundant
and no significant interaction between this salience variable
and the scarcity variable, both Fs \ 1. For the situation of
scarcity in this study, then, it appears that it is stronger
engagement–sustained attention rather salience-drawn
attention that underlies the scarcity effect on value.
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Fig. 1 Study 1. Payment offered for a disliked yogurt as a function of
condition (Scarce or Replenish) and yogurt chosen by participant
(Solitary or Abundant)
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Study 2
Study 2 sought to extend the results of Study 1 by showing
an intensification effect of scarcity for both a liked object
and a disliked object, while also demonstrating that the
scarcity involved in one set of objects can impact the value
of a separate ‘unrelated’ object in the same setting, as
suggested by RET.
Method
Forty-seven students in a university research pool (29
women and 18 men) participated for pay. We presented
participants with a tray containing an array of one type of
product (half the participants saw pens, the other half saw
notebooks). Participants either chose between two types of
pens (one type solitary and one type abundant) or two types
of notebooks (one type solitary and one type abundant). As
in Experiment 1, there were replicates of one version
(abundant) and a single instance of another version (soli-
tary). We told half the participants that whichever product
they chose would be replaced by another of the same kind
(Replenish), and we told the other half that their chosen
product would not be replaced (Scarce). The participants
first chose and evaluated a product, using a 15-item Likert-
type scale (-7 = dislike it very much, 7 = like it very
much). Next, using the same dependent measure as in
Experiment 1, the participants stated how much money
they were willing to pay to buy the product they chose. For
the second ‘‘unrelated’’ product, the participants next tried
a distasteful drink (either watered-down Kool Aid or
watered-down tomato juice, which piloting indicated were
evaluated negatively), and we recorded how much they
drank as the dependent measure. The participants were
then debriefed, thanked, and paid for their participation.
We predicted that participants in the Scarce condition
would offer to pay more for the first, liked product,
regardless of whether they chose the abundant (six items)
or solitary (one item) version of the product. We also
predicted that the situation of scarcity established for the
first product would spread to the second ‘‘unrelated’’
product, intensifying the negative value of the watered-
down drink, causing participants in the Scarce condition to
drink less of the mildly disliked drink.
Results
Evaluations confirmed that our participants liked the first
product they received (M = 3.15, SD = 3.06). As in
Experiment 1, the solitary item was not chosen more than
the abundant item in either the Scarce or the Replenish
condition, v2 (1, N = 47) \ 1. Controlling for age, gender,
and product type (pens or notebooks), we found partici-
pants were willing to pay more for the first liked product in
the Scarce condition t(47) = 1.84, p = .07, and this dif-
ference was found among those participants who chose the
solitary cup (Scarce condition, M = $1.47, SD = .57;
Replenish condition, M = $1.11, SD = .54) and among
those participants who chose one of the abundant products
(Scarce condition, M = $1.39, SD = .59; Replenish con-
dition, M = $1.23, SD = .54) (Fig. 2). There was no sig-
nificant effect of solitary versus abundant and no
significant interaction between this salience variable and
the scarcity variable, both Fs \ 1.
Of particular importance, participants in the Scarce
condition drank significantly less of the unrelated, dis-
tasteful drink than participants in the Replenish condition,
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Fig. 2 Study 2. Payment offered for a liked product as a function of
experimental condition (Scarce or Replenish) and product chosen by
participant (Solitary or Abundant)
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Fig. 3 Study 2. Milliliters of disliked drink consumed (ml) as a
function of experimental condition (Scarce or Replenish) and product
chosen by participant (Solitary or Abundant)
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t(17) = 2.16, p = .04. On average, participants in the
Replenish condition drank 38 (±7.3) ml while participants
in the Scarce condition drank 21 (±3.6) ml—45 % less in
the Scarce condition (Fig. 3).
Study 3
Together, Studies 1 and 2 found that, for the situation of
scarcity in these studies, it is stronger engagement-sus-
tained attention rather salience-drawn attention that
underlies the scarcity effect on value, and the scarcity
involved in one set of objects can impact the value of a
separate ‘unrelated’ object in the same setting, as suggested
by RET. Study 3 considered a possible boundary condition
for the scarcity effect on value. The stronger engagement in
Studies 1 and 2 derived from the situation of scarcity
creating an interfering force that participants needed to
oppose to continue with their decision making. Opposing
an interfering force is only one source of stronger
engagement. Other sources include regulatory fit and using
proper means while making a decision (Higgins et al. 2003,
2008).
Yet another source of stronger engagement is experi-
encing an object or event as real (vs. imaginary), such as
being told that a future event has a high likelihood of
happening (treated as real) or only a low likelihood of
happening (not treated as real). Treating something as real
recruits resources to deal with it, thereby strengthening
engagement (Higgins et al. 2013). Participants vary in how
real they experience the object choices to be. If they
experience the object choices as real, then the predicted
scarcity effect on value should occur. But if they do not
experience the object choices as real, then the predicted
scarcity effect should be reduced or even eliminated. Study
3 investigated this potential boundary condition by mea-
suring how real participants’ experienced the decision
situation.
Method
Ninety university students (64 women and 26 men) par-
ticipated online. Participants were told that they would be
entered into two lotteries. The first was for $50, and we
would select one winner from the entire study. The second
was for a binder with the University’s logo on the front,
and we would select one winner for this lottery each day
the study runs. Participants then proceeded to choose which
binder they would prefer. Participants were given four
choices: three of them were identical red binders (abun-
dant) and one was a black binder (solitary).
Similar to Studies 1 and 2, participants were randomly
assigned to either the Scarce condition or the Replenish
condition. In the Replenish condition, the participants were
told that whichever binder they chose would be replaced so
that all participants would have the same choice options. In
the Scarce condition, the participants were told that those
were the only binders left, thus if they had won, their
binder choice would not be available to future winners. We
then asked participants to report how real the binders
seemed to them (1 = not at all, 5 = extremely). Partici-
pants with scores from 3 to 5 were considered as experi-
encing the choice situation as relatively real, whereas those
with scores of 1 or 2 were considered as experiencing the
choice situation as relatively unreal. Finally, they were
asked how much they were willing to pay if they were
given the opportunity to purchase the binder. At the end of
the study the participants were debriefed, thanked, and paid
for their participation.
Results
We predicted that scarcity would affect payment value only
when participants experienced the choice situation to be
real. To analyze payment value, we used Poisson regres-
sion (a generalized linear model with a log link and a
Poisson error distribution), which accounts for the non-
normality and count nature of the dollar amounts offered
for the binders. Among participants who found the binders
to be real (N = 56), being in the scarce (vs. replenish)
condition led to significantly greater valuation of the
binders (M = $5.39, SD = 4.32), almost a third more than
participants in the replenish condition (M = $4.10,
SD = 3.46; z = 2.14, p \ .05). Consistent with Studies 1
and 2, this effect did not depend on whether participants’
choice was the solitary object or the abundant object
(Scarce vs. Replenish 9 Solitary vs. Abundant interaction,
F \ 1). This effect also remained significant after con-
trolling for age, gender, and binder choice (z = 2.02,
p \ .05). Among participants who found the binders to be
unreal (N = 34), those in the scarce condition (M = $3.12,
SD = 2.29), if anything, offered non-significantly less than
those in the abundant condition (M = $3.53, SD = 3.11;
z \ 1, p [ .5).
General discussion and conclusions
This research contributes to the scarcity–attention proposal
by demonstrating that for the scarcity situation that we
examined, it is stronger engagement-sustained attention
rather than salience-drawn attention that underlies the
scarcity effect of making positive objects more positive and
negative objects more negative. In addition, the studies also
demonstrate that the scarcity involved in one set of objects
can impact the value of a separate ‘unrelated’ object in the
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same setting, as suggested by regulatory engagement the-
ory. Indeed, Study 2 found that the situation of scarcity can
make a negative ‘unrelated’ object more negative while the
positive scarce object becomes more positive. Finally,
Study 3 identifies a boundary condition—people must
experience the objects in the choice situation as real in
order for scarcity to affect value. With the first evidence
that a more general situation of scarcity causes intensifi-
cation of the value of multiple products, our studies dem-
onstrate the power of the scarcity–sustained attention–
engagement link for understanding value and generating
new research in this important field.
We interpret the findings of our studies in terms of the
sustained attention involved in engagement that is
strengthened by opposing the interference from the situation
of scarcity, where resources are recruited to maintain atten-
tion and the motivational force experience of attraction or
repulsion is intensified by this resource recruitment. There
are other possible interpretations of our findings that are
different from regulatory engagement theory but, nonethe-
less, share some understandings of what might be going on in
the situation of scarcity that intensifies value. Our scarcity
manipulation, for example, could be conceptualized as
making the decision-making activity more difficult and, in
anticipation of this difficulty, energy-motivational arousal is
mobilized that intensifies evaluative responses. This model
is discussed in Brehm and Self (1989), but these authors also
point out that such effects should not persist after the activity
is completed. Their model, then, would not account for the
transfer effect in Study 2 where the negativity of the negative
drink increases even though this activity occurs after the
decision in the prior situation of scarcity is completed. It
should be noted, however, that there is another version of
mobilizing energy-motivational arousal where the arousal
can have post-activity residual effects on value intensity akin
to Zillmann’s (1978) excitation–transfer effects on value
(Wright et al. 1990). This is an intriguing possibility whose
difference from our regulatory engagement mechanism
needs to be explored.
Brehm also has another model that, in this case, would
share our interpretation of the situation of scarcity in terms
of opposing an interfering force. Brehm’s (1999) theory of
emotional intensity proposes that any interfering force, or
deterrent, will intensify an emotion—both positive and
negative—up to the point that it cannot be overcome. Our
proposal that an interfering force, if opposed, strengthens
engagement that intensifies evaluative responses—both
positive and negative—is generally consistent with this
proposal. This is not to say that Brehm’s theory of emo-
tional intensity is the same as regulatory engagement the-
ory. Brehm’s theory identifies other factors that contribute
to emotional intensity that are not part of regulatory
engagement theory and regulatory engagement theory
postulates additional sources of engagement strength other
than opposing interfering forces, such as regulatory fit (see
Higgins 2006), use of proper means (Higgins et al. 2008),
and expressions of likelihood that make future events more
real (Higgins et al. 2013). Nonetheless, there are implica-
tions of Brehm’s theory that are applicable to regulatory
engagement theory as well, such as his theory highlighting
an important boundary condition to intensification from
opposition—that the interfering force could become too
strong to be overcome (i.e., too strong to oppose), which
would produce disengagement and de-intensify the evalu-
ative responses. This boundary condition deserves more
empirical attention that it has received.
We should also emphasize that while our findings help
corroborate the scarcity literature’s proposal that scarcity
can intensify value through increasing attention, it is note-
worthy that situations of scarcity may not always increase
attention in a way that strengthens engagement. It is pos-
sible that scarcity affects value through increasing attention
only to the extent that the increased attention strengthens
engagement. Just drawing attention from salience, for
example, may not be sufficient by itself to affect value if it is
not followed by sustained attention. In our studies, for
instance, salience from being a solitary (vs. abundant)
object did not affect value. Regulatory engagement theory
suggests that strengthened engagement depends on indi-
viduals being in a situation where their action has an effect.
Scarcity may strengthen engagement and intensify value
only when individuals believe their action will matter—in
the case of our situation of scarcity, deciding whether or not
to take the last item knowing that it will not be replaced.
This situation of scarcity is experienced by all participants
in the scarcity condition regardless of whether they ulti-
mately choose the solitary or abundant object, and its effect
on strengthening engagement occurs independently from
which object is more salient.
From this perspective, there could be situations that are,
objectively, ‘‘scarcity’’ situations, such as charitable
appeals about endangered species, in which scarcity would
not produce sustained attention because engagement would
be weakened by people not believing that their actions
would have any significant effect. In such situations,
engagement would be weakened because people feel pow-
erless in the face of such strong natural forces, or believe
that irreversible damage has already been done. A critical
factor in these situations may be individual differences in
strength of engagement as a function of individuals’ sense
that they will be effective in making a difference by taking
action (for a discussion of effectiveness, see Higgins 2012).
Indeed, the value effect in such scarcity situations could
also be reduced by people not experiencing the objects as
being real, as when a threatened, almost extinct species has
become so rare that it feels almost imaginary, like the
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extinct dodo bird. In this regard, it should also be noted that
expressing the low likelihood that the almost extinct species
will survive—in the hope that this will make the need to
help the species seem more urgent—could actually make
the species seem less real and thus less valuable (see Hig-
gins et al. 2013). These possibilities should also be exam-
ined in future research.
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